Hands-On Deep Web Analysis. by Sion Retzkin

Author:Sion Retzkin [Sion Retzkin]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: COM043000 - COMPUTERS / Networking / General, COM053000 - COMPUTERS / Security / General, COM060040 - COMPUTERS / Security / Online Safety and Privacy
Publisher: Packt
Published: 2018-12-26T09:04:31+00:00

But, even with all its security, privacy, and anonymity options, Tails has weaknesses.

For example (according to the Tails website documentation), note the following:

Tails does not protect against compromised hardware—meaning that if an attacker gains physical access to the computer you are running Tails from, it can be unsafe.

Tails can be compromised if installed on or plugged into untrusted systems—remember that you install or run Tails from a computer with its own OS. If that computer is compromised, this can lead to disruption of Tails' protective capabilities.

Tails does not protect against BIOS or firmware attacks—attacks that target the computer's BIOS or firmware aren't protected by Tails.

Tor exit nodes can eavesdrop on communications—the exit node, the last node in the Tor relay network, which connects to the destination server, is not encrypted, and this allows attackers to eavesdrop and capture the communication at that point. To protect yourself, it's recommended to use end-to-end encryption.

Tails makes it clear that you are using Tor and probably Tails—even though you're using Tails and Tor for connecting, which will make it harder to identify you, your ISP, local network admin, or destination server, can identify that you are using Tor.

Man-in-the-middle attacks—as I mentioned previously, the traffic between the exit node and the destination server is unencrypted, which allows attackers to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, where the attacker eavesdrops on the communication.

Confirmation attacks (also known as end-to-end correlation)—traffic entering or exiting the Tor network can be measured and analyzed, which can lead to identifying you.

Tails doesn't encrypt your documents by default—but, Tails ships with encryption tools, just for this purpose.

Tails doesn't clear the metadata of your documents for you and doesn't encrypt the subject and other headers of your encrypted email messages—but, Tails provides tools to anonymize your documents.

Tor doesn't protect you from a global adversary—a global adversary has the capability to monitor all traffic in a network simultaneously. Thus, they could potentially be able to perform statistical analysis on the traffic, to identify Tor circuits and then match the communication to destination servers.

Tails doesn't magically separate your different contextual identities—performing multiple actions in the same session is inadvisable, as Tor has a tendency to reuse the same circuits in a given session. Restarting Tails will make sure that you prevent this.

Tails doesn't make your passwords stronger—don't use weak passwords; need I say more?

Tails is a work in progress—as with all software in development, bugs or security flaws can occur.

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